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wouldn't want to see Scotland lose that sense of dialogue and dialectic
that sense of inner conflict, that used to be regarded as the great weak~
ness of Scottish culture, but which we can now see, I think, to be its distinctive strength.

Katherine Metzo

"Evil's
Scandalous
Logic" 1:
Genocide and the
Legitimacy of the State

It's not really a mass murder. It is
Individua l murder, person by person ,
that becomes mass murder.
-David Scheffer, Deputy Secretary
of State tor War Crimes

Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union, Pol Pot's Cambodia,
former-Yugoslavia and Kosovo,
and contemporary Rwanda are all
cases where the use of violence is
taken beyond the necessities of
war. Such uses of violence are not
consid ered legitimate because they
violate international ethics and
therefore are declared war crimes.
That is, violence neither for the protection of borders, nor for the
struggle for independence, nor for
the acquisition of new land. Violence is used with the intent of annihilating a particular Other. While
scholars have focused primarily on
reactions to genocide, the same degree of attention has not been given
to the calculated logic behind these
mass murders, nor the personalized nature perpetuated in these
crimes. Th e intimate and dehumanizing nature of these war crimes is
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often part of the logic behind them. How can we explain this logically
organized, extreme violence in our modern, civilized, and rational
world of nation-states? Backwardness. Evil. Those of us living in postindustrial countries believe that we live in a "civilized," "modern," and
"moral" world and therefore we see genocide as an aberration. Such
violence is seen as random and illogical. Violence, however, is being
brought upon people by their own leaders in a detached, calculated
way, not randomly.
To write on the subject of genocide as a tool for the creation of a homogeneous "nation" has been challenging for several reasons, not the
least of which is the discomfort it brings. My own interest in this topic
goes back to 1991, during my first trip to Europe, but it has been cultivated by many other observations, experiences and professional interests. Walking through Auschwitz my thoughts ran from shock to
horror to amazement. What caused the silence and what was the logic
at work behind the systematic and rationally calculated murders of millions of people? We in the modern industrialized nations are appalled
by what we see as evil, grotesque and unjust, and therefore we search
for a simple answer to put our minds at ease. It could never be that "rational," "civilized," "modern" humans could execute such a "rational,
carefully calculated design ... [free of] contingency and chance, and
independ[ent] from group emotions and personal motives" (Bauman
91). But that is exactly what happened in the Holocaust and in Stalinist
USSR and it is happening again in Bosnia.
This paper is one attempt to come to terms with issues of genocide,
the state, and modernity. I will begin with a discussion of political anthropological theory and the "modern" nation-state. Then I will look
more particularly at the work of Zygmunt Bauman on the Holocaust
and Robert Hayden on ethnic cleansing and the war in BosniaHerzegovina. Finally, I will examine the case of ethnic cleansing as
genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Modernity and the creation of nation-states have by no means resulted in the elimination of
extreme violence. On the contrary, genocide has been used as a tool by Lead-

ers of modern, civilized nation-states to transform the state through the homogenization of a target nation, and thereby legitimate the state's power and
authority over that nation.
Nations, States, and Nationalism
While unilinear evolution implies that every culture takes the same
route and arrives at the same end, i.e., the state, the multi-lineal model
admits that societies or groups progress at different rates and in different ways, but there remains the ethnocentric notion that the highest
point is still the civilized, modern state. Neither of these evolutionary
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models help us to deal with the reality of genocide. Genocide, a systematic annihilation of a population "in whole or part," seems to be, in reality, a construction of civilization (or states, in the second model). Both
the earlier unilinear models and the later multi-lineal evolutionary
models were flawed because of their inherent hierarchical nature and
ethnocentrism.
Steadman Upham's edited volume of essays on the unilinear evolutionary model (bands-tribes-chiefdoms-states) proves insightful,
but insufficient in terms of renegotiating the evolutionary hierarchy.
All of the authors in this volume revisit the evolutionary model and try
to find ways in which it can be useful to contemporary scholars.
some degree they are successful, but none of the authors deal specifically with the nature of violence through this evoluti~nary progress~o1:.
Though the ability to use force is a commonly recogruzed charac.t~nstic
of states, the authors here do not examine the use of force to legitimate
state authority. Most of the authors also continue to talk about. societies
in terms of their own homogeneity and limited contact with other
groups.
.
Stephen Plog declares that, "the environment does play a part in selecting social responses that result in changes in political systems"
(177). He continues by warning that this statement alone ~an lead t? environmental possibilism and that his intent is to investigate regional
patterns of change (178). He successfully supports his modes~ goa_I.
However, even after looking at the arguments of other auth~rs in this
collection regarding social and political change ~d the evol~tion of the
state, it is not clear that evolutionary theory can inform a serious understanding of the logic of genocide.
.
Extrapolating from theories which support the evolutiona~ model,
there are several explanations and questions which c~me up. Firs~, one
might claim that genocide is about the problem of dispute~ territory.
According to the traditional evolutionary mod~ls, the state is ma~e up
of smaller polities (tribes, chiefdoms, etc.) which h.ave evolved into a
new centralized stratified structure. Therefore conflicts over land occur
with other stat~s, not within the state. This issue is complicated, of
course, by the concept of nation, which I disc~ss below . .second, one
could argue that genocide is the result of a classic Malthusi~ che~k~
social response to extreme population pressure. Howeve~, if N~ttin~ is
correct in combining the theories of Malthus and Boserup in~ iter~tive
model of political and technological evolutio°;, a new question arises.
How do we explain the fact that, rather than using elaborate technoloS?'
to feed the population, the Nazis used elaborate technology to exterminate millions of people?

!?
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Zygmunt Bauman writes of the concern over the use of technology
for murderous ends in a modern, civilized state.
Like everything else done In the modern-rational, planned, sclentlflcally
Informed, expert, efficiently managed, coordinated-way, the Holocaust
left behind and put to shame all Its alleged pre-modern equivalents,
exposing them as primitive, wasteful and Ineffective by comparison. Like
everything else In our modern society, the Holocaust was an
accomplishment In every respect superior, If measured by the standards
that this society has preached and lnstitutlonallzed. It towers high above
the past genocidal episodes In the same way as the modern Industrial
plant towers above the craftsman's cottage workshop,or the modern
industrial farm, with Its tractors, combines and pesticides, towers above
the peasant farmstead with Its horse, hoe and hand weeding. (Bauman
89)

Here Bauman also invokes the familiar rhetoric of primitive versus
modern, rational and planned versus wasteful and ineffective. At first,
he emphasizes what it means to be modern through this list of adjectives. To emphasize the hierarchical nature of the unique relationship
between modernity and genocide, he uses phrases such as, "left behind," and "put to shame." Though mass murder has occurred historically, the uniqueness of the Holocaust (as well as cases of genocide
since the Holocaust) lies in the fact that it occurred in the "modem
world." By using the rather banal agricultural example which he gives
at the end of this quote, he illustrates the mentality of modernity's evolutionary superiority.
In discussing the nation-state, still more difficulties arise in understanding the logic behind genocide. The definition of nation-state generally requires that state boundaries be contiguous with those of a
particular "nation" (Anderson; Gellner; Seton-Watson); the singular
"nation" set in quotes because of the multiple ways in which populations create "imagined communities" which become nations (Anderson). Kedourie claims that the nation-state instead emerges out of a
movement for social justice. Whatever the purpose of the nation-state,
nations are typically identified based on a common language, shared religion, and collective historical memory. The nation-state, as current
ethnic strife throughout the former Communist bloc attests, has become
the idealized form of the state.
One of the problems with the nation concept is the need for a "massive effort at symbolic construction, of creating a sense of unity, of identification" (Kertzer 179). Zdzislaw Mach reiterates this idea, but with an
even more overt political connotation (Mach). Mach states that identity
formation is a symbolic and dynamic process but also one in which
power dynamics within the group play a major role (x). Anthony Smith
claims that modern nations are descended from a primordial ethnic

group and that authentic ethnic myths serve the purpose of legitimating the nation. Katherine Verdery takes a different approach to understanding ethnic myths and political maneuvering in post-Socialist
countries. Through the selective retelling of ethnic myths and the exhumation of pre-socialist cultural heroes, the elites in Eastern Europe are
constructing and legitimating a new collective identity, not one based
on a primordial ethnic community.
Building the Soviet State during the early part of this century offers
an example of how collective histories and nation-like qualities are manipulated to create a new identity. Stalin's intentions were two-fold in
creating the Soviet State. First, he needed to eliminate political competition from political heretics (those who didn't follow the party line),
kulaks (private landowners), professors, and others who might oppose
the new regime (Deker and Lebed). Second, he needed to destroy or
consolidate homogeneous national groups. Stalin's methods for carrying out these goals included: show trials and executions, population
transfers (separating people from their "homeland"), famine and ~e
eradication of local cultural traditions by sending children to boarding
schools and encouraging intermarriage with Russians. One of the ways
in which anthropologists aided in the homogenization of the "Soviet
people" was through their work on early censuses: silently inte~a~g
smaller ethnic groups into larger ones or dividing more vocal indigenous groups into smaller ones or consolidating them with sur.rounding groups (Hirsch). "It was proof of Stalin's ability as an ad.mirustrator
that his hold over the party was discovered only when it could no
longer be effectively challenged ... In this contest he ~ew on ~l the. advantages of his cold-blooded endurance and supenor craftiness m a
game where everybody played for the highest stakes" (Von Laue 1~).
As an "administrator" Stalin was the highest caliber bureaucrat, m
Bauman's sense of dictating and implementing a plan of destruction m
detached, rational, and mechanical fashion.
Anthropologist Robert Hayden provides an illustrative example of
how the nation-state concept can be problematic:
I

•

The key to the separate nationalist political movements in Yugoslavia
after 1989 was the explicit conflation of the "nation," ethnically defined,
and the "state." Although this formulation was hardly new to European
history, It d id have sinister Implications for minorities in states that were.
suddenly defined as the nation-states of their respective ethnic majorities .
By definition, anyone not of the majority ethnic -nation could only be a
c itizen of second class. (American Ethnologist 787)

Communist Yugoslavia as a "nations-state" (that is, a true multi-national state) had been lauded as a success story after the tumultuo~s
history of the Balkans. However, following centuries of non-democratic
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rule, the constituent nations of Yugoslavia began to participate more in
the politics of their own state, a multi-national state. The separatist politicians who became leaders in the post-Soviet period used the rhetoric
of the nation-state to define their independent states and bring them
into existence. This creation of a nation-state requires the construction
of a legitimate notion of "nation-state." This was especially challenging
to do when so many families saw themselves as Yugoslavs or w ere
members of mixed families (Hayden, American Ethnologist; Woodward;
Denitch). Hayden goes on to say that the winners of the 1990 elections
rewrote their constitutions following the nation-as-state model, thus
limiting the participation of non-nationals (American Ethnologist).

Genocide
Even the concept of modernity itself is drawn into question when
examining genocide. All of the examples presented here take place
within modern Europe. If the modem is rational, civilized, scientific, and
Europe contains the quintessential modern nation-state, then how can
there be genocide in Europe? Shock and disbelief are common among
Bosnians who never expected the violence which descended upon them
(Rieff; Smajlovic). People considered themselves modern and therefore
such atrocities could not happen to them. Rieff talks of Bosnian d isinterest in Rwandan tragedies as somehow being not quite so incredible.
That is, the case of genocide in Africa is more easily dismissed as Africa
is not "modem," like Europe. This is yet another barrier to developing
an understanding of how genocide is constructed and carried out.
Genocide is neither a direct nor ultimate result of modernity, rather it is
a product of modernity (Todorov; Bauman). Auschwitz is not, "the ineluctable-if somewhat premature-outcome of modernity, whose
truth is at last revealed. Moreover, if the term modernity can encompass realities as divergent as democracy and totalitarianism, one must
wonder how useful the term really is" (Todorov 29). It is easy to d ismiss that which does not fit into our normative notions, it is much more
difficult to try to fit the anomalies into our explanation of how the system works.
Yet, the concepts of modernity and the nation-state are closely intertwined.
The permanent and irremedlal homelessness of the Jews was an integral
part of their identity virtually from the beginning of their dlasporlc history.
Indeed, this fact was used as a main argument In the Nazi case against
the Jews, and was employed by Hitler to substantiate the claim that
hostility against the Jews Is of a radically different kind from ordinary
antagonisms between rival nations or races. (Bauman 35)

Here Bauman refers to the de-territorialized character of the Jewish nation. Primordial rights to land are such a large claim to sovereignty
among many ethnic groups (in Chechnya and Chiapas, for example)
that the Jewish dispossession offered "nation" as an exceptional case.
Bauman claims that this lack of a tie to a concrete piece of land is an integral part of Jewish identity. Everywhere they went, they were the
Other. And in the case of Hitler's Germany, this Otherness was used to
instill fear, distrust, and/ or hatred into German public discourse.
Hitler set up the image of the Jews as undermining the German nation.
Thus, he was able to legitimate an offensive against Jews in defense of
his image of the Aryan nation-state.
.
.
Can genocide then be seen as a forn: of ~ationahs~? To some ~x
tent I would claim that it is a form of nationalism. There is a connection
be~een the act of genocide and the state-centered construction of nationalism. For example, the Nazi goal of creating an Aryan race, an extreme "imagined community" (Anderson), is a clear exam~le of
nationalism but nationalism precedes genocide. Conversely, nationalism is neith~r a necessary nor sufficient condition for genocide. However I do see a connection between acts of genocide and the process of
stat~-building whether or not this includes na~onalism. The use of
genocide by Hitler or Stalin is of interest because it marks an attempt at
eliminating resistance, creating homogeneity.
Definitions are almos t always contestable, therefore I will briefly
outline what I mean by genocide using the United Natio~ definition as
w ell as using parts of Bauman's definition. The ~onvention ?nth~ Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was written in response to the Holocaust. Article II of the convention defines genocide in
the following manner:
.. . genocide means any of the following acts committed w!th intent to
destroy, in whole or In part, a natlonal,ethnlc,raclal or religious group.as
such:
(a) Kiiiing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about Its physical
destruction In whole or In part;
(d) Imposing measures Intended to prevent births
within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group. (Chalk and Jonassohn 44)

Several of the key words in the definition are "intent" and "or in part"
which suggests that genocide needs to be neither successful nor c~m
plete to be considered a crime. Though the authors of the convention
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specify "national, ethnic, racial or religious group," the victims of genocide could indeed be of a less commonly recognized, though clearly
marked, group (e.g. homosexuals, handicapped). In terms of what
qualifies as genocide, except for (a) and (e) the definition is sufficiently
ambiguous. "Conditions of life" is the phrase which provides the widest interpretation in what qualifies as genocide. Reservations,
sub-stan2
dard public housing, and environmental racism all potentially fit the
description, though they would remain highly contestable. Even the arguments that genital mutilation and rape in the former Yugoslavia
qualify as both "serious bodily or mental harm" and " measures intended to prevent births" are contested in the official political discourse
(Borneman; Stojsavljevic; Stiglmayer).
The first group of countries to ratify the convention included: Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia,
France, Haiti, Liberia, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippine Republic, United States of America, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. In total, forty-three countries ratified the convention, however Germany, Rwanda, and Cambodia were not among them. "If [the expert
commission definition of ethnic cleansing is] taken seriously, [this]
means that genocide has been a tool for building a number of nationstates that are now honorable members of the world community"
(Hayden, Slavic Review 732). One must wonder, then, whether it is really significant to look at who did or did not ratify the convention.
These states may argue that global conditions have changed in such a
way that transnationalism and globalism are now the norms and genocide or ethnic cleansing are no longer legitimate tools of state formation
(see Basch, et. al.).
The United States further specifies in its ratifying statement that
"mental harm" be taken to mean "permanent impairment of mental faculties through drugs, torture or similar techniques". Though the intent
by the US Congress was to remove ambiguities, I feel that the result is
the direct opposite. "Impairment" can be very severe, requiring continuous hospitalization, or it can be at the level of having "night terrors" (a common affliction among war veterans). It is not clear to what
degree such mental impairment must take place. Also, the phrase
"similar techniques" leaves a very open window for interpretation.
Again, the role of victimized person's perceptions in determining genocide is not clear when one reads "torture or similar techniques." The
dehumanizing acts of genital mutilation and forced sex acts between
prisoners and Serbian soldiers in Bosnia are intended to demoralize the
opposition, but these acts have not always been recognized by the international community as a form of torture (Borneman 293).
In contrast to the definition provided by the United States or the
United Nations, Zygmunt Bauman's definition of genocide is more de1081
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scriptive in terms of selecting the most salient aspects of the UN Convention through the legal rhetoric:
'Ordinary' genocide Is rarely, If at a ll. aimed at the total annihilation of
the group; the purpose of the violence (If the violence Is purposeful and
planned) Is to destroy the marked category (a nat ion, a tribe.a religious
sect) as a viable community capable of self-perpetuation and defense
of its own self-Identity. If this is the case, the objective of the genocide is
met once ( 1) the volume of violence has been large enough to
undermine the will and resilience of the sufferers and to terrorized them
Into surrender to the superior power and Into the acceptance of the
order It Imposed; and (2) the marked group has been deprived of
resources necessary for the continuation of the struggle . (119)

Bauman's definition is in some ways far clearer than the highly politicized UN definition. He states at the outset that total annihilation is
usually not the goal, perhaps questioning whether or not it is actually
possible. The intent of genocide is to destroy the viability of a marked
group. Bauman says that, first, the violence must be great enough to
"undermine" the ability of the victims to resist. This interpretation encompasses the qualifications under the UN Convention while also removing some of the ambiguity over the degree of violence necessary in
determining genocide. When I refer to genocide throughout this paper,
I will be using the UN definition in the sense of Bauman's interpretation.

The Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing
In his 1989 book, Modernity and the Holocaust, Zygmunt Bauman attempts to show the Holocaust as a product of modernity by revealing
the precise logic behind it and rejects the general consensus that the
Holocaust was a "cancerous growth on the body of civilized society"
(viii). His goal in undertaking this effort is to see what unique contributions can be made to the study of the Holocaust by sociologists. "The
Holocaust was an outcome of a unique encounter [which] could be
blamed to a very large extent on the emancipation of the political state,
with its monopoly of means of violence and its audacious engineering
ambitions, from social control" (xiii). The encounter here is between everyday factors at play in the modern world. The state, being the most
highly centralized (or evolved) political form, has, as Bauman puts it, a
"monopoly of means of violence."
Though the Holocaust ended with the extermination of Jews, its beginnings were rooted in the purification of the German race through the
sterilization and murder of handicapped populations (Friedlander).
The rhetoric of purification (or homogenization) continued throughout
each new stage of violence against the Jews (Hinton; Frie~lander). ~he
term "ethnic cleansing" parallels Hitler's rhetoric of a disease which
1109
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threatened the integrity of the German state. It was very easy for Hitler
to target Jews because of their migratory history.
By the very fact of their territorial dispersion and ubiquity, the Jews were
an inter-national nation, a non-national nation. Everywhere, they served
as a constant reminder of the relativity and limits of lndlvldual self-Identity
and communal Interest, which the criterion of nationhood was meant to
determine with absolute and final authority. Inside every nation, they
were the ' enemy inside' .The boundaries of the nation were too narrow to
define them; the horizons of national tradition were too short to see
through their Identity. The Jews were not just unlike any other nation; they
were also unlike any other foreigners. (Bauman 52)

Jews were clearly part of a nation, albeit a divided and migratory one.
This questioned the entire notion of nation-state. The idea of a "transnational nation" was very threatening to Hitler and he aimed to eliminate this Other which he could not define. "In defining the legitimate
borders of the nation, all kinds of mutually contradictory arguments
are used" (Denitch 82). This is as true of Germany as it is of Yugoslavia
(about which this passage was written). In the process of defining a nation, contradictions arose over the right of Jews to live on land where
the~ had been for hundreds of years, and matters of that nature. By declarmg the Jews a non-nation, their rights to citizenship and ownership
were eliminated.
Bauman argues that during the Holocaust there was a bureaucratization of violence:
Stalin's and Hitler's victims were not killed In order to capture and
colonize the territory they occupied. Often they were killed In a dull
mechanical fashion with no human emotions- hatred Included-to
enliven it. They were killed because they did not flt, for one reason or
another, the scheme of a perfect society. Their kllllng was not the work of
destruction, but creation. (92)

The lack of emotion on the part of the killers and the "scheme" which
was being enacted reflects this notion of bureaucratization. Technology
and science, including anthropology (Friedlander), were instrumental
in making the killing process detached and mechanical. Planning of
"cool, thorough and systematic genocide" was made possible because
"modern, rational society paved the way" (Bauman 90; see also,
Todorov). The bureaucratic system also successfully dehumanized the
vic~ms ~f the Holocaust, to the point that every last bit of property
which nught mark their identities was taken away at the anteroom to
the gas chamber at Auschwitz (Wollenberg; Bauman).
Destroying the Other as an act of creation rather than of destruction
is a very difficult concept to grasp. Bauman more clearly outlines what
he means by "creation" a bit further on:

They were eliminated, so that an objectively better human world-more
efficient, more moral, more beautiful-could be esta bllshed. A
Communist world . Or a racially pure , Aryan world . In both cases, a
harmonious world , conflict-free , doclle in the hands of their rulers, orderly,
controlled . People tainted with Ineradicable b light of their past or orig in
could not be fitted Into such unblemlshed ,healthy and shining world . Like
weeds, their nature could not be changed .They could not be improved
or reeducated .They had to be eliminated for reasons of genetic or
ldeational heredity-of a natural mechanism , resilient and immune to
cultural processing . (92-93)

Though I differ with Bauman's use of the term "objectively," I do not
doubt that this is how Stalin and Hitler perceived their goals. Considering again the process by which nations are created, Bauman suggests
that Aryan and Communist notions of inferiority were drawn from
their perception that reform was impossible for some groups: namely
Jews, Gypsies, and the handicapped. These "others" threatened the formation of the ideal homogeneous state and are figured in its rhetoric as
sub-human. Though a genetic argument was not as prevalent in
Stalinist propaganda, as I will show below, the notions of "purity" and
"unalterable natures" were common.
In two articles from 1996, Hayden looks at ethnic cleansing and
genocide in Bosnia both to analyze how it is used in self-determination
or state-building and to understand the logic behind it. Against the explanations of ethnic fighting and genocide as resulting from long repressed nationalism, Hayden argues:
that the wars have been about the forced unmlxlng of peoples whose
continuing coexistence was counter to the politician Ideologies that won
the free elections of 1990.Thus extreme nationalism In the former
Yugoslavia has not been only a matter of Imagining a llegedly 'primordia l'
communities , but rather of making existing heterogeneous ones
unimaginable. (American Ethnologist 783)

Hayden points out the contradiction between the notion of the nationsta te, which requires imagining a homogeneous community, and the
reality of the heterogeneous republics of the former Yugoslavia. The
"unmixing" (homogenization) was possible because the existence of
heterogeneity was challenged, made "unimaginable." Ethnic cleansing,
says Hayden, is a result not only of forcible transfers and murder, but
also of "bureaucratic discrimination" (784). One of the other bureaucratic means of discrimination which directly lead to ethnic-cleansing
and which I mentioned above was the creation of a nation-state, institutionalized through new constitutions in 1990.
Hayden's second article "Schindler's Fate," is much more controversial in terms of its acceptance into the academic community (Slavic
Review). In it, Hayden eliminates the distinction between "population
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transfers," "ethnic cleansing," and genocide. The degree of violence is
not of concern, rather the motivations and logic behind it. He claims
that the efforts by Czechs after the war to expel Germans from Czechoslovakia was an intent to destroy the German population "in whole or
in part" (729) . Hayden makes this controversial statement to lead into
his argument that, "the crimes of the Holocaust provide a rhetorical
structure that lends itself to justifying the process that it professes to
abhor" (730). He argues that many countries have used ethnic cleansing
to promote their own legitimacy in the international arena and are now
well-respected states. However, this does not excuse the present violence being perpetrated in Bosnia. Rather, Hayden takes this approach
to show that genocide or ethnic cleansing is a tool which states use to
create legitimacy.
Such objectivity in analyzing the events during and after the Holocaust is difficult to come by and has caused Hayden's work to be severely critiqued. "Schindler's Fate" was followed by several
commentaries and a response by Hayden (see commentaries by Lilly;
Woodward; and Wallace in Hayden, Slavic Review) . In the critiques of
Hayden, several of the authors claim that he is doing something very
dangerous by ignoring or understating the moral implications of ethnic
cleansing, population transfers, and genocide. These authors do not
seem to agree that these terms are all referring to degrees of the same
process. Lilly goes as far as claiming that Hayden's work is immoral
and unethical. The other authors agree that such an analysis needs to
take place, but caution against comparisons which compare different
regions and different policies. While Hayden is searching for a broad er
theoretical concept to understand the logic of genocide, his critics argue
that context is the only way to understand the policies and actions in
each case.

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo
Recent work on the former Yugoslavia by Hayden has caused more
than a little tension in post-Communist studies. Hayden, however, remains unwavering in his attempts to come to terms with the logic behind large scale ethnic violence. In this way, his work is very similar to
that of Bauman as an attempt by a social scientist to understand genocide from within the framework of a discipline which has avoided this
material for a long time.
Conflict in Bosnia has brought forth numerous interpretations of the
fall of Yugoslavia. Some focus on primordial ethnic conflict, others on
the nature of the violence and the significance that has for the nature of
the ethnic hatred, but these explanations do not give a clear understanding of what is going on behind the genocide (Denitch). On the
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other hand, there are also studies which take a more holistic look at the
events surrounding the fall of Yugoslavia. Misha Glenny, Susan Woodward, and Tone Bringa provide such studies. Glenny continually points
to the fact that it is not merely a pre-communist ethnic rivalry, but
rather a combination of the romanticization of national pasts, "memories" of conflicts before and during the Hapsburg and Ottoman reigns,
the constituent republics and, most importantly, the events of the communist period. Glenny, a journalist, focuses primarily on the communist period, especially the events which directly lead to the civil/
international war.
... the very mechanism which brought such a swift end t o enmity
between Serbs and Croats In 1945 had been the suppression of all
national political rights: Serb ,Croat,Macedonian,Albanian ,Hungarian ,
Italian , Moslem, and Slovene allke. lndlvidual national identity was
c onsumed by the all-purpose Yugoslav ideal which enjoyed a strong
appeal among many for sustained periods of the Tltoist state. (Glenny 12)

Throughout the early years of the war large numbers of people, esp.ecially in Bosnia, still self-identified as "Yugoslavs" and 1:11-any were c~
dren or partners in mixed marriages (Hayden, American Ethnologist;
Bringa). Throughout the fighting there has been a need to place blame
somewhere, to identify and punish the perpetrators (Bauman also talks
of this in the German context). However, Glenny also warns that by
each side using the "atrocities" of the other to justify their own violent
behavior, the reciprocity of violence will continue.
. .
Susan Woodward argues against the idea that some sort of atavistic
relations exist between the constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia, as well. "The Yugoslav conflict is inseparable from internation~
change and interdependence, and it is not con~~d to ~~e Balk~ ~;it is
part of a more widespread phenomenon of political disintegration (3).
She, like Glenny, points out that this disintegration has ha.ppened. under a particular set of circumstances and over a l~ng p~nod of trme.
However, her argument fails to understand the logic ~ehin~ the genocide. She does not draw any conclusions about the relationship between
the political disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the use of gei:ocide to legitimate the homogeneous nation-states that are to re~lace it.
Borneman also presents the conflict in the former ::igosl~vi~ as the
struggle between two modem Western European political pnnc1ples"the creation of sovereign peoples conceived as cul~rally homogeneous self-constituting majorities within a nation form, and
homogeneous self-constituting majorities within a nation form and the
•
t a t e (276)
assertion of this sovereignty through terntonal contra1 mas
. .·
Bomeman's focus in the study of genocide in the former Yugoslavia is
.
based on dehumanization, the production
of permanent "b0 dilYand
1
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mental harm" through sexual violence.
Tone Bringa, an anthropologist from Norway, takes yet another perspective on the events in the former Yugoslavia. Her study, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way, focuses on a rural village outside Sarajevo which is
made up primarily of Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Her account is
more distanced than the others from the topic of war and genocide, but
she does this intentionally. Her goal is to show how identity is formed
among a small population which is confronting both civil war and
genocide. This approach is still very much a part of the discussion on
the war as it is one of the few studies currently available on contemporary identity creation by individuals in a time when there is debate raging over who is allowed to assign identity. Her conclusions reinforce
the idea that people will continue to determine their own identities despite government attempts to force cultural identity assignments on a
given people. The kuca, or household, is the center of identity formation
among the Bosnian Muslims, making identity a very localized phenomenon, rather than pan-Islamic or anti-Serbian/Croatian. In fact, villagers did not sharply demarcate the differences between Serbs, Croats,
and Muslims as their government did. However, she notes that war has
changed the ways in which people self identify; they are now turning to
a wider, international Islamic community to define their own identity.
New York Times war journalist, Chuck Sudetic has written about
one family and their perspective on the Srebenica massacre in his book,
Blood and Vengeance. In his introduction to the book he tells of how he
came to write from the perspective of a single family. After talking with
both Serbs and Muslims, he "realized [the Serbs'] stories dovetailed
with the Muslims' and also began with memories of a time long before
the war, memories of fistfights, funerals, and feasts ... [of relatives] who
exacted blood vengeance to appease their dead, and who suffered defeat and buried their guns for another day" (Sudetic xxxvii). Like
Bringa, Sudetic describes a very localized reaction to the war and he
sheds light on the ways in which people lived their everyday lives during this time. Blood vengeance in this context is based on generations,
not centuries, as the popular press would have us believe. Conflicts are
based on traceable historical memory, often to events that occurred
during and since the second World War, not on primordial ethnic conflicts that stem from centuries old conflicts between the Ottomans and
the Serbs.
Several times throughout the book, Sudetic refers to Vidovdan, the
feast day of St. Vitus. This is the date of one of the most important "ethnic myths" of the Serbs. On June 28, 1389, on Vidovdan, the Ottoman
Turks defeated the Serbs in the battle of Kosovo, a defeat that has figured prominently in the creation of a post-Communist, Serbian iden-
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tity. However, as the studies by Bringa and Sudetic show, Muslims in
Bosnia have not identified themselves with the pan-Turkic or pan-Islamic image with which the Serbian elites identify them. This ethnic
myth is revived at several crucial moments in Serbian history, including the Orthodox cries for vengeance in the eighteenth century and the
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on Vidovdan in 1914
(Sudetic). Most recently, on the six hundredth anniversary of the battle
of Kosovo, the bones of Prince Lazar, who was killed in the battle, were
taken on a pilgrimage around Serbia as if, "his death would finally be
avenged and he would be able to rest in peace" (79). Or, according to
the interpretation provided by Katherine Verdery, the parading of
these bones had a symbolic value in legitimizing the borders of the
Serbian State, headed by Milosevic. In other words, this "symbolic construction," to use Kertzer's words, created a sense of unity, legitimizing
the efforts of the Milosevic government to homogenize the state and
avenge age-old ethnic hatreds. The rhetoric suggests the e~i~tence of
nations that for centuries have not gotten along, but the emp1ncal studies of Bosnia, outlined above, all suggest that this sense of nation is not
primordial, rather it is something clearly constructed in the present.
Just as international politicians made a concentrated effort to not
use the term genocide to describe the events in Bosnia, they are no~
trying not to use the term "ethnic clean~ing" to. ~escribe the eve~t~ in
Kosovo. Many of the stories of separating farmhes by gender, killing
male prisoners, and burning villages are the similar to those fr~m
Bosnia, though General Wesley Clark and Secretary General Javi~r
Solana use very guarded language. In the order to commence air
strikes, which came on March 23, 1999, Javier Solana used terms such as
"humanitarian disaster," "humanitarian catastrophe," and "hum~ suffering ... repression and violence against the civilian population of
Kosovo" (NATO March 23). Other language has also been used, for example, "attacks on [Serbia's] own people" (NA~O ,~arch 29) an~ the
"brutal destruction of human lives and properties (NATO April 1).
One can find only an occasional reference to "ethnic cleansin~" in the
text of NATO press releases (NATO April 1). Moreover, ethnic c~eans
ing was not referred to as something already in ~rogress, rather it ~as
mentioned as something to be prevented. According to th~ Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the act of
murdering Kosovar men is murder aimed at a specific ethnic gr~up
which also has an effect on the reproductive ability of the population,
forcing people from their homes and burning down villages als~ severely threatens the future of this population. Howe~er, the ter~ol
ogy of "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" is becoming progressively
more politically charged in international arenas, as Serbians claim that
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as minorities outside of Serbia, they are also the victims of ethnic
cleansing. For these people, rhetoric has fused with a shared historical
memory and sense of vengeance to serve as legitimation for the Serbian
government's actions against its minority populations.

Conclusion
Within my analysis, I have focused on more extreme examples of
genocide in order to show how it is used as a tool to construct and legitimate a homogeneous nation-state. I believe that it is an important
moral and ethical obligation for us to look at genocide in new ways in
order to understand the logic behind the use of violence in state formation and to begin questioning "legitimacy" and "power." To borrow a
phrase from Geertz, we must create a "thick description" of past and
present genocides. Both Bauman and Hayden admit the difficulty of
writing about a topic which is so morally offensive, but neither of them
have shied away from the task. "We are caught in a trap of morality: the
more actions are explainable, the less culpable they seem" (Hayden,
Slavic Review 730). And later he states: " ... I need to make it explicit that
my basic goal was that proposed by Max Weber, 'to recognize "inconvenient" facts,' meaning those that controvert comfortably established
opinions, including my own" (767).
Bauman reminds us: "The Holocaust was born and executed in our
modern rational society, at the high stage of our civilization and at the
peak of human cultural achievement, and for this reason it is a problem
of that society, civilization and culture" (x). Both authors provide starting points for discussion, that this paper engages. Genocide is a tool, a
means to an end, not an end in and of itself. The authors who have written about the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina have all given us different
windows on how genocide is planned, practiced, and perceived.
Milosevic has not single-handedly annihilated hundreds of thousands
of Bosnians and Kosovars. The rhetoric of the victimized Serbian nation
has been used at various moments in the history of Serbia and Yugoslavia, but to different ends. Analyses of the symbolic construction of
power, such as those by Kertzer and Verdery provide useful directions
in which to push the analyses of the Holocaust and ethnic cleansing by
Bauman and Hayden. Ethnic violence at the end of the twentieth century also raises questions about the nature of state politics as communications, economies, and families become increasingly transnational.
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Notes
1

2

A phrase adapted from Milan Kundera's "evil's scandalous beauty" by
Hayden (Slavic Review 731).
The idea that environmentally threatening structures (landfill, nuclear waste
facility, excessively polluting factory, etc.) are located in poorer areas with a
high minority population.
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